Consecutive Misdemeanor Sentencing: Curing The Inequity by Nicols, Gary R. & Caldwell, Harry M.
Pepperdine Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 4 Article 1
5-15-1986




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation




BY GARY R. NICHOLS* AND HARRY M. CALDWELL**
"Let the punishment fit the crime,"1 expresses a bedrock concept
of Anglo-American jurisprudence.2 However, as is true of most fun-
damental policy statements, application to specific situations often
yields results which cannot be reconciled with the seminal theory.
Such an anomaly currently exists in California law pertaining to con-
secutive misdemeanor sentencing.
California statutory law, literally read, allows unlimited consecu-
tive misdemeanor sentences.3 Conversely, consecutive sentences for
multiple felony offenses are generally subject to stringent restric-
tions on both the consecutive terms which may be imposed as well as
the length of the aggregate term.4 The imposition of unrestrained
* Chief Appellate Attorney, Office of the Public Defender, County of Ventura.
B.A. California Lutheran College, 1975; J.D. Ventura College of Law, 1978. Deputy
Public Defender, County of Ventura, 1981-84.
** Associate Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, Pepperdine
University School of Law. B.A. (cum laude) California State University, Long Beach,
1972; J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law, 1976. Deputy District Attorney,
County of Riverside, 1976-79; Deputy District Attorney, County of Santa Barbara, 1979-
80.
1. W. Gilbert & A. Sullivan, The Mikado or the Town of Titipu; Let The Punish-
ment Fit The Crime (March 14, 1885), Full score (Leipzig 1898).
2. Protection against cruel and unusual punishment is provided in U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 17 and amend. VIII. Amendment VIII to the U.S. Constitution provides: "Ex-
cessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 19a, 669 (West 1985). Section 19a provides in part:
"In no case shall any person sentenced to confinement in a county or city jail ... on
conviction of a misdemeanor ... or for any reason except upon conviction of more
than one offense when consecutive sentences have been imposed, be committed for a
period in excess of one year .... Section 669 provides in part: "When any person is
convicted of two or more crimes . . . the second or other subsequent judgment upon
which sentence is ordered to be executed shall direct whether the terms of imprison-
ment or any of them to which he is sentenced shall run concurrently or consecutively
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(a),(g) (West 1985). Section 1170.1(a) provides:
Except as provided in subdivision (c) and subject to section 654, when any per-
consecutive misdemeanor sentences netted one man a term of nine
years, seven months in county jail in 1984 for multiple misdemeanor
drunk driving offenses 5 and has resulted in other misdemeanants re-
ceiving county jail terms of six and one-half years,6 five and one-half
years,7 and four years, three months.8 While many may believe, as
apparently the sentencing judges did, that the punishments meted
out in these four examples did "fit the crime[s]," comparison of these
sentences with sentences imposed for multiple felony offenses reveal
that inequity exists in the law9 which allows, in many instances, less
son is convicted of two or more felonies, whether in the same proceeding or
court or in different proceedings or courts, and whether by judgment ren-
dered by the same or a different court, and a consecutive term of imprison-
ment is imposed under sections 669 and 1170, the aggregate term of
imprisonment for all these convictions shall be the sum of the principal term,
the subordinate term and any additional term imposed pursuant to section
667.5, 667.6, or 12022.1. The principal term shall consist of the greatest term of
imprisonment imposed by the court for any of the crimes, including any en-
hancements imposed pursuant to section 12022, 12022.3, 12022.4, 12022.5,
12022.6, 12022.7, 12022.8 or 12022.9. The subordinate term for each consecutive
offense which is not a "violent felony" as defined in subdivision (c) of section
667.5 shall consist of one-third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed
for each other such felony conviction for which a consecutive term of impris-
onment is imposed, and shall exclude any enhancements. In no case shall the
total of subordinate terms for such consecutive offenses which are not "vio-
lent felonies" as defined in subdivision (c) of section 667.5 exceed five years.
The subordinate term for each consecutive offense which is a "violent felony"
as defined in subdivision (c) of section 667.5, including those offenses de-
scribed in paragraph (8) of subdivision (c) of section 667.5, shall consist of one-
third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for each other such fel-
ony conviction for which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed, and
shall include one-third of any enhancements imposed pursuant to section
12022, 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.7, or 12022.9.
Section 1170.1(g) provides:
The term of imprisonment shall not exceed twice the number of years im-
posed by that court as the base term pursuant to subdivision(b) of section 1170
unless the defendant stands convicted of a "violent felony" as defined in sub-
division (c) of section 667.5, or a consecutive sentence is being imposed pursu-
ant to subdivision (c) of this section, or an enhancement is imposed pursuant
to section 12022, 12022.3, 12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7, 12022.9, or the defendant
stands convicted of felony escape from an institution in which he is lawfully
confined.
5. L.A.. Daily J., Oct. 1, 1984, § II, at 1, col. 3. See also People v. Carr, 6 Cal. 2d
227, 228, 57 P.2d 489 (1936) (approving four consecutive one year sentences); People v.
Blume, 183 Cal. App. 2d 474, 482, 7 Cal. Rptr. 16, 21 (1960). For treatment outside Cali-
fornia, see People v. Knaub, 624 P.2d 922, 923 (Colo. 1980); State v. Divers, 51 Or. App.
351, 625 P.2d 681 (1981).
6. People v. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1985). Defend-
ant pleaded guilty to thirteen counts of grand theft under Cal. Penal Code § 487(1),
was sentenced to six months in the county jail for each count, to run consecutively,
and was placed on probation for an additional six and one-half years. See infra notes
43, 75-78, and accompanying text.
7. In re Jiminez, 166 Cal. App. 3d 686, 688, 212 Cal. Rptr. 550, 552 (1985).
8. People v. Haendiges, 142 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 9, 12, 191 Cal. Rptr. 785, 788 (1983).
Defendant was convicted of numerous violations of driving under the influence of
drugs and/or alcohol. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
9. For instance, under the present statutory scheme, the maximum sentence
which could be imposed for twenty felony burglary counts is eleven years (a six-year
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serious offenders such as misdemeanants to be punished more se-
verely than. more serious offenders such as felons.10
Compounding the anomaly is the difficulty of reviewing multiple
maximum consecutive misdemeanor sentences. The difficulty is
caused by the complete absence of any guidelines for trial courts to
follow in making the sentencing choice or the absence of any require-
ment that the factors considered by the sentencing court in arriving
at that choice be specified. Additionally, once a nonprobationary sen-
tence has been imposed and its service commenced, the trial court is
without jurisdiction to modify the sentence even if the trial judge de-
cides that the sentence was unduly harsh or otherwise deserving of
reconsideration. These difficulties have been recognized with respect
to felony sentencing, and safeguards have been incorporated into the
felony sentencing scheme. This article examines the California con-
secutive sentencing laws as they apply to misdemeanor sentencing,
compares that scheme with the rules applicable to consecutive felony
sentencing, and proposes legislative action which can eliminate the
disparity found to exist between the two.
I. CALIFORNIA FELONY SENTENCING
A. The Determinate Sentencing Law
To fully appreciate the severity of the felony-misdemeanor ineq-
uity currently existing in California sentencing, it is necessary to re-
view California felony sentencing. In 1976, the California Legislature
abandoned the indeterminate sentencing scheme and enacted the De-
terminate Sentencing Law."1 In so doing, the legislature specifically
set forth in the statute its findings and intent:
The legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment. This purpose is best served by terms proportionate to
the seriousness of the offense with provision for uniformity in the sentences
of offenders committing the same offense under similar circumstances. The
Legislature further finds and declares that the elimination of disparity and
the provision of uniformity of sentences can best be achieved by determinate
sentences fixed by statute in proportion to the seriousness of the offense as
base term with a five-year cap on consecutive sentences, while the maximum sentence
for twenty misdemeanor burglary counts is twenty years (one-year maximum for each
count running consecutively).
10. Use of the terms "less serious" or "more serious" offenses refers solely to the
statutory classifications of the offense as a misdemeanor or felony and is not intended
to address questions of moral culpability.
11. 1976 Cal. Stat. 1139; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1986). See Note, Re-
view of Selected 1976 California Legislation, Criminal Procedure, 8 PAC. L.J. 282, 283
(1977).
determined by the Legislature to be imposed by the court with specified
discretion.1
2
Under the Determinate Sentencing Law, most felonies, other than
those carrying sentences of death or life imprisonment, have three
specified possible terms of imprisonment: the low or mitigated term,
the middle term, and the upper or aggravated term. When a prison
sentence is to be imposed, the middle term specified for the offense is
the presumptive term unless there are circumstances in aggravation
or mitigation of the crime. 13 The circumstances in aggravation or mit-
igation which the trial judge may consider are set forth in the Rules
of Court promulgated by Judicial Council,14 and the circumstances
found and relied on by the trial court must be set forth on the record
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1986). Section 1170(b) reads in part:
"When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are
circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime."
14. CAL. RULES CT. 421, 423.
The Judicial Council is a constitutionally created body consisting of the Chief Jus-
tice, members from the bench from each of the five levels of state court, a member of
each house of the legislature and members of the bar. CAL. CONST. art. 6 § 6. Its pow-
ers and duties are prescribed by the constitution and statutes.
Under Rule 421, circumstances in aggravation include:
(a) Facts relating to the crime, including the fact that:
1) The crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bod-
ily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness or cal-
lousness, whether or not charged or chargeable as an enhancement under
section 12022.7.
2) The defendant was armed with or used a weapon at the time of the com-
mission of the crime, whether or not charged or chargeable as an enhance-
ment under section 12022 or 12022.5.
3) The victim was particularly vulnerable.
4) The crime involved multiple victims.
5) The defendant induced others to participate in the commission of the
crime or occupied a position of leadership or dominance of other participants
in its commission.
6) The defendant threatened witnesses, unlawfully prevented or dissuaded
witnesses from testifying, suborned perjury, or in any other way illegally in-
terfered with the judicial process.
7) The defendant was convicted of other crimes for which consecutive
sentences could have been imposed but for which concurrent sentences are
being imposed.
8) The planning, sophistication or professionalism with which the crime was
carried out, or other facts, indicate premeditation.
9) The defendant used or involved minors in the commission of the crime.
10) The crime involved an attempted or actual taking or damage of great
monetary value, whether or not charged or chargeable as an enhancement
under section 12022.6.
11) The crime involved a large quantity of contraband.
12) The defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to com-
mit the offense.
(b) Facts relating to the defendant, including the fact that:
1) He has engaged in a pattern of violent conduct which indicates a serious
danger to society.
2) The defendant's prior convictions as an adult or adjudications of commis-
sion of crimes as a juvenile are numerous or of increasing seriousness.
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if either the mitigated or aggravated term is imposed. 15
3) The defendant has served prior prison terms whether or not charged or
chargeable as an enhancement under section 667.5.
4) The de:endant was on probation or parole when he committed the crime.
5) The defendant's prior performance on probation or parole was
unsatisfactory.
Under Rule 423, circumstances in mitigation include:
(a) Facts relating to the crime, including the fact that:
1) The defendant was a passive participant or played a minor role in the
crime.
2) The victim was an initiator, willing participant, aggressor or provoker of
the incident.
3) The crime was committed because of an unusual circumstance, such as
great provocation, which is unlikely to recur.
4) The defendant participated in the crime under circumstances of coercion
or duress, or his conduct was partially excusable for some other reason not
amounting to a defense.
5) A defe.adant with no apparent predisposition to do so was induced by
others to participate in the crime.
6) The de-fendant exercised caution to avoid harm to persons or damage to
property, or the amounts of money or property taken were deliberately small,
or no harm was done or threatened against the victim.
7) The defendant believed he had a claim or right to the property taken, or
for other reasons mistakenly believed his conduct was legal.
8) The defendant was motivated by a desire to provide necessities for his
family or himself.
(b) Facts relating to the defendant, including the fact that:
1) He has no prior record or an insignificant record of criminal conduct con-
sidering the recency and frequency of prior crimes.
2) The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that sig-
nificantly reduced his culpability for the crime.
3) The defendant voluntarily aknowledged wrongdoing prior to arrest or at
an early stage of the criminal process.
4) The defendant is ineligible for probation and but for that ineligibility
would have been granted probation.
5) The defendant made restitution to the victim.
6) The defendant's prior performance on probation or parole was good.
15. CAL. RULES CT. 433(c)(1). Rule 433(c)(1) provides with respect to matters to
be considered at time set for sentencing:
(a) In every case, at the time set for sentencing pursuant to section 1191, the
sentencing judge shall hold a hearing at which the judge shall:
1) Hear ard determine any matters raised by the defendant pursuant to sec-
tion 1201.
2) Determine whether a defendant who is eligible for probation should be
granted or denied probation, unless consideration of probation is expressly
waived by the defendant personally and by counsel.
(b) If the imposition of sentence is to be suspended during a period of proba-
tion after a conviction by trial, the trial judge shall make factual findings as to
circumstances which would justify imposition of the upper or lower term if
probation is later revoked, based upon evidence admitted at the trial.
(c) If a sentence of imprisonment is to be imposed, or if the execution of a
sentence of imprisonment is to be suspended during a period of probation, the
sentencing judge shall:
1) Hear evidence in aggravation and mitigation and determine, pursuant to
When a person is convicted of two or more felonies for which
sentences may be imposed, whether in the same proceeding or court
or in different proceedings or courts, and whether the judgment is
rendered by the same court or by a different court and consecutive
sentences are imposed, the court generally proceeds as follows:
1) The court first imposes sentence on the -offense for which the
greatest term of imprisonment will be imposed, choosing between the
three possible terms for that offense by applying the aggravating and
mitigating factors found. This is the "principal" or "base" term.16
2) For each other offense for which a consecutive or
"subordinate" term is to be imposed, the court shall impose one-
third of the middle term of imprisonment prescribed for the
offense;17
3) The total of the subordinate terms shall not exceed five
years;' 8
4) The total term of imprisonment may not exceed "twice the
number of years imposed . . as the base term."'19
section 1170(b), whether to impose the upper, middle or lower term; and set
forth on the record the facts and reasons for imposing the upper or lower
term.
2) Determine whether any additional term of imprisonment provided for an
enhancement charged and found shall be stricken.
3) Determine whether the sentences shall be consecutive or concurrent if
the defendant has been convicted of multiple crimes.
4) Determine any issues raised by statutory prohibitions.
5) Pronounce the court's judgment and sentence, stating the terms thereof
and giving reasons for those matters for which reasons are required by law.
(d) All these matters shall be heard and determined at a single hearing un-
less the judge otherwise orders in the interests of justice.
(e) When a sentence of imprisonment as imposed under subdivision (c) or
under rule 435, the sentencing judge shall inform the defendant, pursuant to
section 1170(c), of the parole period provided by section 3000 to be served after
expiration of the sentence in addition to any period of incarceration for parole
violation. P.C. § 1170(b),(c).
16. "Base term" or "principal term" is defined as "the greatest term of imprison-
ment imposed by the court for any of the crimes." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (a).
(West Supp. 1986).
17. Id. The "one-third the middle term" rule does not apply to certain sex of-
fenses where full, separate and consecutive terms may be imposed, and certain kidnap-
pings involving separate victims on separate occasions. Id. § 1170.1(b)(i).
18. Id. § 1170.1(a). The five-year maximum for subordinate terms does not apply
to (1) offenses committed while the perpetrator is in state prison or an escapee from
state prison, (2) "violent" felonies as defined in § 667.5(c), (3) the sex offenses for
which full, separate, and consecutive terms may be imposed under § 667.6(c), or
(4) "consecutive offenses which are all residential burglaries" for which the total
subordinate term may not exceed ten years. Id. § 1170.95.
19. Id. § 1170.1(g). The "double the base term" rule does not apply, inter alia, to
"violent" felonies, id.; sex offenses, id. § 667.6(c); residential burglaries, id.
§ 1170.95(b); offenses committed by state prison inmates or escapees, id. § 1170.1(c); or
where enhancements are imposed for weapons use, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022, 12022.5
(West 1982); excessive taking or damage, id. § 12022.6; infliction of great bodily injury,
id. § 12022.7; or for prior felony convictions, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 667.5, 667.6
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In decid:ing whether to impose consecutive sentences, the trial
court is prohibited from using the same factors in aggravation to im-
pose both an upper base term and consecutive sentences.20 If the
court decides to impose consecutive sentences, the reasons upon
which that decision is based, as well as the reasons for imposing other
than a middle base term, must be set forth on the record. 21
B. Review For and Correction of Disparate Felony Sentences
Once a convicted felon is sentenced to state prison, two separate
procedures exist, exclusive of resort to the appellate courts, for re-
viewing and correcting disparate sentences. The first such procedure
empowers the trial court to recall a sentence within 120 days of its
imposition and resentence the defendant as if he had not previously
been sentenced.22 If the court exercises its discretion to recall and
resentence a convicted felon, it may not sentence the defendant to a
greater aggregate term than originally imposed, although it may re-
duce the term or leave it the same.23 The order to recall and resen-
(West Supp. 1.986). Crimes such as kidnapping, sodomy by force, etc. are dealt with
slightly differently. See id. § 1170.1(b)(1).
20. Id. § 1170(b); People v. Lawson, 107 Cal. App. 3d 748, 753, 165 Cal. Rptr. 764,
767 (1980).
21. CAL. 'PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1986); People v. Enriquez, 159 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 5, 205 Cal. Rptr. 238, 241 (1984). Section 669 of the California Penal Code
allows concurrent and consecutive sentencing; section 1170 gives the parameters for re-
sentencing. However, in felonies the court must specifically state the reasons for im-
posing consecutive sentences. People v. Bejarano, 114 Cal. App. 3d 693, 173 Cal. Rptr.
71 (1981); People v. Walker, 83 Cal. App. 3d 619; 148 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1978). Further, the
court may not use the same facts to justify both an aggravated or upper term sentence
and a consecutive sentence:
A fact charged and found as an enhancement may be used to impose the up-
per term, whereupon the additional term of imprisonment prescribed for that
fact as an enhancement shall be stricken. The use of the fact to impose the
upper term is an adequate reason for striking the additional term of
imprisonment.
CAL. RULES CT. 443(b).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (West Supp. 1986). Section 1170(d) provides in
part:
[T]he courct may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own mo-
tion, or at. any time upon the recommendation of the Director of Corrections
or the Board of Prison Terms, recall the sentence and commitment previously
ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he or she had
not previously been sentenced, provided the new sentence, if any, is no
greater than the initial sentence. The resentence under this subdivision shall
apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council so as to eliminate disparity
of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing ....
23. Id. A recall of sentence and commitment previously ordered may also be made
upon the recommendation of the Director of Corrections or the Board of Prison
Terms. Id.
tence must be made on the court's own motion; the defendant has no
standing to make such a motion.24 The statutory provisions which al-
low for such an order within 120 days of the commitment to prison
are an exception to the rule that the court loses jurisdiction of the
matter upon finality of the judgment (sixty days following judgment
in felony cases). It also appears that the court could exercise its re-
call and resentence power even if the matter is then pending in the
appellate courts.25
The second procedure for review of disparate felony state prison
sentences is a statutorily mandated review by the Board of Prison
Terms within the first year of the sentence.26 That review compares
the sentence with those imposed in similar cases throughout the
state. The Board employs a three-step procedure, which includes an
initial screening by computer to identify cases in which potentially
disparate sentences have been imposed, a second screening by the
Board's staff of those cases indicated by the computer screening, and
a final review by a Board panel of those cases referred to it by the
staff as potentially disparate.27 If the Board determines that a partic-
ular sentence is disparate, it is required to notify the sentencing
judge, the prosecutor, the defendant and his attorney of that finding
and the reasons for the finding. Upon receipt of such notification,
the trial court is required to schedule a hearing within 120 days. At
that hearing the court may recall the previously imposed sentence
and resentence the defendant on its own motion in the same manner
as described above. At the resentencing hearing, the court shall con-
sider the information supplied by the Board of Prison Terms and
should give it great weight.28
The recall and resentence procedures are safeguards that neither
require nor necessarily imply that the original sentence was an abuse
24. Id.; People v. Gainer, 133 Cal. App. 3d 636, 641, 184 Cal. Rptr. 120, 123 (1982).
25. A notice of appeal from a felony conviction must be filed within sixty days of
the imposition of judgment. Cal. Rules Ct. 31(a). The trial court is generally divested
of jurisdiction to modify a judgment once an appeal is perfected. See People v. Perez,
23 Cal. 3d 545, 591 P.2d 63, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40 (1979). The court in Perez stated that the
"filing of a valid notice of appeal vests jurisdiction in the appellate court .... [W]e
need not determine whether in the present case this rule precluded the trial court
from amending judgment." Id. at 554, 591 P.2d at 69, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 45. See also Peo-
ple v. Sonoqui, 1 Cal. 2d 364, 366, 35 P.2d 123, 124 (1934).
The 120 days within which the trial court may recall and resentence under section
1170(d) necessarily extends at least sixty days into the period following the filing of a
timely notice of appeal. It therefore appears that the legislature intended the provi-
sions of section 1170(d) to be an exception to the general rule that the taking of an
appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to modify a judgment.
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f) (West Supp. 1986).
27. BOARD OF PRISON TERMS, REPORT ON SENTENCING PRACTICES, DETERMINATE
SENTENCING LAW 3-4 (1985) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f)(1) (West Supp. 1986); People v. Herrera, 127 Cal.
App. 3d 590, 600, 179 Cal. Rptr. 694, 700 (1982).
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of discretion or otherwise erroneous. In performing its sentence re-
view duties, the Board of Prison Terms assumes that the sentence
originally imposed is a legal sentence and that the sentencing court
complied with all applicable sentencing rules and procedures.2 9
Sentences imposed in violation of those rules and procedures are re-
viewable on direct appeal or in some instances by extraordinary
writ.30 Despite the elaborate safeguards and procedural require-
ments in felony sentencing, a large portion of felony appeals involve
an alleged error in sentencing. 31 This may be a result of the com-
plexity of the statutory sentencing scheme.
II. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES
In addition to felonies, there are two other distinct, statutorily de-
fined classes of crime: misdemeanors and infractions. 32 Infractions
are not punishable by incarceration 33 and are not dealt with herein.
Misdemeanors are punishable by fines and/or county jail sentences of
six months or less, 3 4 unless otherwise specified, but in no case more
than one year.35 This contrasts with felonies which are punishable by
death or imprisonment in the state prison.36
It is the exclusive province of the legislature to classify crimes and
29. See Report, supra note 27, at 3.
30. See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, APPEALS
AND WRITS IN CRIMINAL CASES §§ 1.25 and 2.111 (1982).
31. There appear to be no statistics on the percentage of felony appeals which
raise sentencing error issues. However, in response to inquiries of the authors, knowl-
edgable members of the California Courts of Appeal, the Attorney General's Office,
and the criminal defense appellate bar have provided estimates ranging from twenty to
fifty percent.
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 16 (West 1970).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19c (West 1970):
An infraction is not punishable by imprisonment. A person charged with an
infraction ;hall not be entitled to a trial by jury . . . [or] to have the public
defender or other counsel appointed at public expense to represent him unless
he is arrested and not released on his written promise to appear, his own re-
cognizance. or a deposit of bail.
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West Supp. 1986): "Except in cases where a different
punishment is prescribed by any law of this state, every offense declared to be a misde-
meanor is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or
by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both."
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 19a (West 1970); see supra note 3. There are certain of-
fenses which are classified as misdemeanors for which no jail sentence may be im-
posed, such as possession of less than 28.5 grams of marijuana. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 11357(b) (West Supp. 1986).
36. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1986): "A felony is a crime which is
punishable with death or imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime or pub-
lic offense is a misdemeanor except those offenses that are classified as infractions."
determine that one class of crimes is more "heinous" and therefore
deserving of more severe penalties.37 The California classification
follows the classic hierarchy of criminal offenses and comports with
the general understanding that misdemeanors are "offenses lower
than felonies." 38  Additionally, there exists a subgroup of offenses
commonly called "wobblers" which may be classified as either felo-
nies or misdemeanors depending on the discretion of the prosecutor
in the first instance and later the trial judge. 39 The trial judge may
reduce a "wobbler" charged by the prosecutor as a felony to a misde-
meanor, but the trial judge may not increase a "wobbler" to a fel-
ony.40 "Wobblers" include offenses such as burglary, grand theft,
forgery, receiving stolen property, battery against a police officer
with injury, or against anyone with serious bodily injury, assault with
a deadly weapon, and vehicular manslaughter. As misdemeanors,
"wobblers" carry a maximum sentence of one year in county jail; as
felonies, the sentence range is generally sixteen months, two years,
or three years in state prison.41
It has long been held that a municipal court can impose consecu-
37. People v. Smith, 218 Cal. 484, 489, 24 P.2d 166, 168 (1933).
38. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 900 (5th ed. 1979).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b).
When a crime is punishable in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment
in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misde-
meanor for all purposes under the following circumstances:
1) After a judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment in the
state prison.
2) When the court, upon committing the defendant to the Youth Authority,
designates the offense to be a misdemeanor.
3) When the court grants probation to a defendant without imposition of
sentence and at the time of granting probation, or on application of the de-
fendant or probation officer thereafter, the court declares the offense to be a
misdemeanor.
4) When the prosecuting attorney files in a court having jurisdiction over
misdemeanor offenses a complaint specifying that the offense is a misde-
meanor, unless the defendant at the time of his arraignment or plea objects to
the offense being made a misdemeanor in which event the complaint shall be
amended to charge the felony and the case shall proceed on the felony
complaint.
5) When, at or before the preliminary examination or prior to filing an order
pursuant to section 872, the magistrate determines that the offense is a misde-
meanor, in which event the case shall proceed as if the defendant had been
arraigned on a misdemeanor complaint.
40. Id.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE § 489 (West Supp. 1986) (grand theft); id. § 461 (burglary);
id. § 473 (forgery); id. § 496 (recovering stolen property); id. § 243(c),(d) (battery
against a police officer with injury; battery against any person with serious bodily in-
jury); id. § 245 (assault with deadly weapon); id. § 193(c) (vehicular manslaughter). See
also id. § 18 (punishment for felony not otherwise prescribed). There are, as with mis-
demeanors, a few unusual exceptions to the general rule. For instance, willful failure
to provide child support, id. § 270, carries a misdemeanor sentence of one year in
county jail, but a felony sentence of one year and one day in state prison. Spousal
rape, id. § 262, carries a one year jail sentence as a misdemeanor and a range of three,
six, or eight years as a felony. Id. § 264.
[Vol. 13: 965, :986] Misdemeanor Sentencing
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tive sentences totaling in excess of the one year jurisdictional limit
for a single offense.42 However, the Appellate Department of the
Los Angeles Superior Court recently held that a municipal court may
not impose an aggregate consecutive sentence for "wobblers," all
charged as misdemeanors, that exceeds the maximum sentence au-
thorized had all the offenses been charged as felonies.43 Dicta in the
same case, as well as reason and equal protection principles, suggest
that consecutive sentences for "straight" misdemeanors may not ex-
ceed the same maximum.44 Nonetheless, no statutory or case law
limit exists which places a "cap" on the aggregate length of consecu-
tive misderaeanor sentences. Even if it is assumed, as the authors of
this article have, that equal protection precludes aggregate consecu-
tive misdeaeanor sentences totalling more than six years (the maxi-
mum for "wobblers" sentenced as felonies), there still exists an
anomalous situation in which an offender convicted of crimes which
are less serious is subject to a sentence that on its face is equal to the
maximum allowable for more serious offenses and therefore harsher
relative to the class of offenses. It should also be pointed out, in
terms of t he actual sentence served, that the misdemeanant sen-
tenced to six years in county jail may serve up to one-third more
time in custody than the felon sentenced to the same term in state
prison.45
42. People v. Carr, 6 Cal. 2d 226, 228, 57 P.2d 489, 489 (1936); People v. De Casaus,
150 Cal. App. 2d 274, 280, 309 P.2d 835, 839 (1957) (section 19a not intended to limit
imprisonment to one year where several misdemeanors were committed and sentences
ran consecutively); People v. Blume, 183 Cal. App. 2d 474, 428, 7 Cal. Rptr. 16, 22 (1960)
(misdemeanor sentences on several counts running consecutively constitute a single
sentence). See also United States v. Manjarrez-Arce, 382 F. Supp. 1047, 1049 (S.D. Cal.
1974).
43. People v. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1985). CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170 (West Supp. 1986). In People v. Powell, the defendant pleaded
guilty to thirteen counts of grand theft. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 489 (West Supp. 1986).
The trial court sentenced him to six months in the county jail for each count, with the
sentences to run consecutively, and placed him on probation for an additional six and
one-half years. Grand theft under section 489 is a "wobbler" calling for a sentence of
one year maximum in county jail as a misdemeanor and a sentence of either sixteen
months, two years, or three years in state prison as a felony. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d
Supp. at 16, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 457. Had all counts been charged as felonies, and maxi-
mum sentences imposed, the maximum sentence the defendant could have received
would have been six years.
44. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 26, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 464. But see In re Va-
lenti, 224 Cal. Rptr. 10 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986). See inofra notes 79-87 and accompany-
ing text.
45. This result is based on the fact that felons in State prison may earn up to one-
half off their sentence by participation in a work or education program, CAL. PENAL
III. CALIFORNIA MISDEMEANOR SENTENCING
Virtually none of the protective rules or procedures which apply to
felony sentencing applies to misdemeanor sentencing, nor are there
corresponding provisions relating solely to misdemeanors. The impo-
sition of a misdemeanor sentence has a "Wild West" tenor in which
the judge has a broad range of choice as to jail time, generally from
zero days up to 180 or 365 days or anywhere within that range.46
There is no requirement that the sentencing judge make any state-
ment of reasons for imposing a particular misdemeanor sentence, nor
are there any formal guidelines for choosing an appropriate sentence.
Some municipal courts appear to impose maximum sentences as a
matter of course if probation is not granted or is rejected. Some
courts will routinely impose and suspend execution of a less than
maximum sentence as a condition of probation; some will suspend
imposition of sentence only, thereby retaining the ability to sentence
the defendant to the maximum term should the defendant violate
probation.47 The decision whether consecutive sentences should be
imposed is likewise devoid of regulation by formal guidelines or re-
strictions other than the prohibition against double punishment for
the same act.48 Just as there is no requirement that reasons be stated
for the imposition of any particular sentence, there is no requirement
that reasons be stated for the imposition of consecutive sentences.
Neither is there any prohibition against using the same factors to im-
pose both maximum and consecutive sentences.
The decision to impose maximum consecutive sentences usually ap-
pears to be the subjective perception of the sentencing judge that the
defendant has had enough chances (for example, by prior probation
grants), has not learned a lesson (since defendant is a repeat of-
fender), and therefore is not entitled to any leniency. Indeed, many
of the very long misdemeanor sentences result when a defendant ap-
pears on one or more newly charged offenses along with several vio-
lations of probation based on the new offense. The defendant in such
a case is consecutively sentenced to the maximum sentence for all of-
fenses and violations. The same result most likely could not occur in
a felony matter since the consideration of events subsequent to a
grant of probation is prohibited in determining the appropriate term
CODE § 2933 (West Supp. 1986), whereas a county jail inmate may only earn a maxi-
mum of one-third off of this sentence for work or good conduct. Id. § 2900.5.
46. There are a few misdemeanor offenses which carry minimum mandatory
sentences, most notably repeat drunk driving offenses and narcotics use offenses. See,
e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE, §§ 23165, 23166, 23170, 23171, 23175, 23176 (West 1985); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550 (West Supp. 1986).
47. These observations are based upon the experience of the authors and others
familiar with the practices of various southern California municipal courts.
48. CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West Supp. 1986).
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of imprisonment and whether or not to impose enhancements upon a
revocation of probation. 49 In such circumstances, the felony sentenc-
ing judge is confined to making those decisions based upon the "cir-
cumstances existing at the time probation was granted." 50 Almost
certainly the judge would not have granted probation in the first in-
stance if the case were aggravated enough to justify a maximum sen-
tence. Once a misdemeanant commences service of a
nonprobationary jail sentence, the sentencing court is without juris-
diction to modify that sentence even if the sentencing judge wishes to
do so.
5 1
One can only speculate as to the reasons why the legislature has
chosen to impose such stringent and pervasive limitations and review
procedures on consecutive felony sentencing but has virtually ig-
nored misdemeanors. Undoubtedly the state is justified in making
provision for greater protection to persons who are in greater jeop-
ardy, if not indeed compelled to do so. In most instances, the defend-
ant charged with a felony is most at risk. Felony convictions not only
carry significantly longer potential sentences individually, but also
result in certain civil disabilities such as loss of the right to vote 52 and
the right to possess firearms.53 Felony convictions may also be used
in the future to impeach testimony and to enhance sentences for sub-
sequent crimes. 54
It may be that misdemeanors are considered sufficiently "insignifi-
cant" not to warrant the same consideration. That perception may in
large part be due to the fact that misdemeanors are generally not
newsworthy. Moreover, appeals from misdemeanors are heard by
49. CAL. RULES CT. 435(b)(1):
If the imposition of sentence was previously suspended, the judge shall impose
judgment and sentence after considering any findings previously made and
hearing and determining the matters enumerated in rule 433(c). The length
of the sentence shall be based on circumstances existing at the time probation
was granted; and subsequent events may not be considered in selecting the
base term nor in deciding whether to strike or specifically not order the addi-
tional punishment for enhancements charged and found.
50. Id.
51. People v. McAllister, 15 Cal. 2d 519, 526, 102 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1940). But see
People v. Thomas, 52 Cal. 2d 521, 534, 342 P.2d 889, 897 (1959) (providing an exception
to the rule).
52. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 4; CAL. ELEC. CODE § 707 (West Supp. 1986).
53. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021 (West Supp. 1986). Section 12021 provides in part
that "[a]ny person who has been convicted of a felony ... who owns or has in his
possession . . . any pistol, revolver, or other fire arm . . . is guilty of a public offense
54. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f).
the appellate departments of the superior court in proceedings in
which judges are not required to render written opinions.55 There-
fore, misdemeanor cases very rarely result in opinions published in
the official reports.
Whatever the reason, it is obvious that the arena of misdemeanor
sentencing is much more susceptible than the arena of felony sen-
tencing to sentences that are disparate, not only in comparison with
other misdemeanor sentences, but also in comparison with many fel-
ony sentences. It seems highly doubtful that the legislature intended
to eliminate disparity in felony sentencing and encourage or even
permit it in misdemeanor sentencing. The fact that such disparate
misdemeanor sentences are not only possible, but are in fact imposed
on a regular basis, compels the conclusion that a problem exists.
Should the problem be addressed on an ad hoc basis or is a formal-
ized generally applicable solution indicated? If a generally applicable
solution is needed, how should it be constructed?
IV. THE PROBLEM OF A SOLUTION
The authors believe that the current "Wild West" environment of
misdemeanor sentencing is a problem that requires solution. That be-
lief is based on the conviction that the differentiation in the classifi-
cation of crimes between misdemeanor and felony not only is a
considered legislative decision that the crimes designated as misde-
meanors should not be punished as or more harshly than felonies,
but also is based on the historical definition of those classifications
and notions of proportionality and equal protection.
A. Constitutional Issues
The problem of disparate misdemeanor sentencing has constitu-
tional dimensions. Article I section 7 of the California Constitution
provides that "[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law or denied equal protection of the
laws."56
Two cases in the Appellate Department of the Los Angeles Supe-
rior Court have considered equal protection issues in disparate misde-
meanor sentencing. In the first, the court upheld consecutive
misdemeanor sentences amounting to four years and three months
on numerous convictions of driving under the influence of drugs and/
or alcohol, but acknowledged in dicta that misdemeanor sentences
"clearly" or "proportionately in excess of sentences for more serious
55. CAL. RULES CT. 106.
56. The California constitutional provision mirrors the due process protection of
amendments V and XIV to the United States Constitution.
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offenses" would raise equal protection concerns.5 7 In the second case,
the court found a violation of the equal protection rights of the de-
fendant in imposition of consecutive sentences amounting to six years
and six months for "wobblers" charged as misdemeanors, a longer
sentence that would have been possible under the Determinate Sen-
tencing Law had the "wobblers" been charged as felonies.58
Two cases in the California Courts of Appeal, one decided in
March 1986 and one pending at the time of this article's writing, also
confront the unequal sentencing misdemeanants receive. In the first
of these cases, a Ventura County court refused to find any violation
of a misde:meanant's rights under the California Constitution in
sentences totaling three years and six months even though, according
to the petitioner's calculations, if the limitations applicable to felonies
under the Determinate Sentencing Law had been applied, the maxi-
mum sentence imposed would have been limited to two years.5 9 In
the second case, arising in San Joaquin County, the misdemeanant
sought a sentence limited by the "one-third the middle term" provi-
sion applicable to felony sentencing. 60
Clearly the equal protection concerns appear ripe. In addition to
the equal protection issue, additional questions are raised under the
eighth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I
section 17 of the California Constitution which provide that "cruel or
unusual punishment may not be inflicted."61
57. People v. Haendiges, 142 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 9, 12, 191 Cal. Rptr. 785, 788 (1983).
See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
58. People v. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1985). See in-
fra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
59. In re Valenti, 224 Cal. Rptr. 10 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The Second District
Court of Appeals had previously denied the misdemeanant's petition for writ of habeas
corpus, and he sought relief from the California Supreme Court. On November 20,
1985, the California Supreme Court granted review in In re Valenti on habeas corpus
and transferred the matter to the same court with instructions to issue an order to
show cause. That order to show cause was heard February 19, 1986. Despite the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's intervening action, the appellate court again denied the peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus and discharged the order on March 5, 1986. For the
previous holding in In re Valenti, see 153 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 35, 200 Cal. Rptr. 862
(1984). See also iqfra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
60. People v. Hyde, No. 3 Crim. 14917 (3d Dist. Ct. App. heard May 19, 1986), or-
dered before decision to the Third District Court of Appeal from the Appellate De-
partment of the San Joaquin County Superior Court. Hyde was set for hearing in the
court of appeal on May 19, 1986. As of the date of this article, that court has issued no
decision.
61. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17. See also U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
1. Equal Protection
To challenge a legislative enactment on equal protection grounds,
it is first necessary to demonstrate that the challenged provision
treats two similarly situated groups unequally. 62 In this case, the two
identified groups are misdemeanants and felons.6 3 Courts have held
that since felons and misdemeanants are confined for the same pur-
pose, punishment for crime, they are therefore "similarly situated"
with respect to their "liberty interest."64 The California Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that "liberty" is a fundamental interest
under both the United States and California Constitutions.65 Once it
is determined that the right affected is a fundamental right, the state
must show that there exists a compelling interest to justify the dif-
ferent treatment of two similarly situated groups,6 6 and that the dis-
62. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 530, 601 P.2d 549, 553, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320
(1979). Cf. In re Rogers, 19 Cal. 3d 921, 934, 569 P.2d 1286, 1294, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298, 306
(1977) (application to a juvenile setting).
63. With the extension of Penal Code section 1170.1 to juveniles and mentally dis-
ordered sex offenders, either of those two groups may be compared with misdemean-
ants. See infra note 105 and accompanying text. However, for purposes of comparison
of sentencing, it must be taken into account that felons/misdemeanants as a group and
juveniles or mentally disordered sex offenders are confined for different reasons. The
purpose of confinement for felons/misdemeanants is punishment. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1170 (West Supp. 1986). In the case of juveniles, "minors adjudged wards of the
courts are committed. . . for the purposes of treatment and rehabilitation." In re Eric
J., 25 Cal. 3d 522, 531, 601 P.2d 549, 553, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 321 (1979). On the basis of
this difference, the court in In re Eric J. held that minors adjudged wards of the juve-
nile courts and adults in prison (felons) were not "similarly situated." The protection
of section 1170.1 was afforded juveniles by the court because section 726 of the Welfare
and Institutions Code expressly referenced it. In re Eric J., 25 Cal. 3d at 536, 601 P.2d
at 557, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 325 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726 (West Supp. 1986)).
64. In People v. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 22 n.9, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454, 462
n.9 (1985), with regard to the imposition of consecutive sentencing, the court held that
felons and misdemeanants had identical liberty interests. In In re Valenti, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 10 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986), the court agreed with Powell that the loss of liberty is
"equally drastic" in terms of confinement for misdemeanants and felons, requiring ap-
plication of a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 12 n.2. In People v. Sage, 26 Cal. 3d 498,
611 P.2d 874, 165 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1980), felons and misdemeantants were held to be
"similarly situated" with regard to allowed pre-trial conduct credits.
65. "[P]ersonal liberty is a fundamental interest, second only to life itself, as an
interest protected under both the California and United States Constitutions." People
v. Saffell, 25 Cal. 3d 223, 228, 599 P.2d 92, 93, 157 Cal. Rptr. 897, 900 (1979) (quoting
People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 551 P.2d 375, 384, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 64 (1976)).
66. "[O]nce it is determined that [a] classification scheme affects a fundamental in-
terest or right the burden shifts; thereafter the state must first establish that it has a
compelling interest which justifies the law and then demonstrate that the distinctions
drawn by the law are necessary to further that purpose." People v. Olivas, 17 Cal. 3d
236, 251, 551 P.2d 375, 385, 131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 65 (1976). Accord In re Valenti, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 12, 12 n.2 (citing Olivas). See generally In re Moye, 22 Cal. 3d 457, 465, 584
P.2d 1097, 1103, 149 Cal. Rptr. 491, 497 (1978) (construing the personal liberty interest
of a defendant committed to a mental institution due to a finding of not guilty by rea-
son of insanity); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 355, 535 P.2d 373, 384, 121 Cal. Rptr.
509, 520 (1975) (construing the right to jury trial); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 597,
487 P.2d 1241, 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 609 (1971) (wealth as a suspect classification).
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tinction in law is necessary to further that interest.
There appears to be no such compelling interest justifying the dif-
ferent treatment of felons and misdemeanants. In People v.
Haendiges,37 the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles affirmed a sentence of four years and three months in
county jail based solely on a reluctance to overrule existing prece-
dent. 68 However, the court acknowledged in dictum that "[a]ny inter-
pretation of California's statutory scheme of punishment which
would lead. to potential misdemeanor sentences, which are either
clearly in excess, or proportionately in excess, of sentences for more
serious offenses, might well deny . . . equal protection." 69 The con-
cept of equal protection requires that persons equally situated receive
like treatment.70
Misdemeanors are defined as "[o]ffenses lower than felonies." 71
However, because the maximum statutory penalties prescribed for
misdemeanors are severe in relation to the penalties ordinarily im-
posed for misdemeanor convictions, a possibility of unequal treat-
ment is created that is compounded when a judge imposes
consecutive sentences.72
Aside from the basic inequity of sentencing a defendant who has
committed a lesser offense to a longer term, thereby defeating the
state's purpose for imprisonment of punishment proportional to the
crime,73 the misdemeanant sentenced to multiple consecutive terms
ends up confined for an extended period in county jail, a facility built
67. 142 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 9, 191 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1983). Defendant was sentenced to
four years and three months in county jail based on six violations of the Vehicle Code
and violation of probation on three of those counts. He was also sentenced for proba-
tion violations stemming from offenses committed on four separate occasions in 1978
and 1979. Id.
68. Id. However, the court also indicated that no court had addressed this issue on
equal protection or cruel and unusual punishment grounds up to that point in time.
Id. at 26, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
69. Id. at 24, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
70. In re Gary W., 5 Cal. 3d 296, 303, 486 P.2d 1201, 1207, 96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1971).
Cf. Cal. Penal Code § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986) ("the purpose of imprisonment for
crime is punishment . . . [and] this purpose is best served by terms proportionate to
the seriousness of the offense.")
71. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 901 (5th ed. 1979).
72. Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections on the
Neal Doctrine, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 389 (1970). Professor Johnson argues that multi-
ple concurrent sentencing is rarely prejudicial, whereas consecutive sentencing is the
source of excessive punishment.
73. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986). See supra note 12 and ac-
companying text.
for the express purpose of short-term confinement.7 4
The Appellate Department of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County finally confronted the equal protection issue in People v.
Powell,75 a case which addressed, the constitutionality of consecutive
sentencing in the case of "wobblers" charged as misdemeanors which
exceeded the maximum permissible sentences had the "wobbler" of-
fenses been charged as felonies.76 The court found denial of the ap-
plication of section 1170.1 of the Determinate Sentencing Law to be
in violation of the equal protection rights of the defendant. 77 How-
ever, the court declined to rule on the constitutionality of consecutive
sentencing as applied to all misdemeanants, although in dictum they
indicated that similar results would be reached.78 Nonetheless, it is
the clear mandate of Powell that to bar the application of section
1170.1 to all misdemeanants is probably a violation of equal
protection.
The first California Court of Appeal to consider equal protection
issues in imposition of consecutive multiple misdemeanor sentences
filed its opinion in In re Valenti 79 on March 5, 1986, rejecting a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus with respect to consecutive misde-
meanor sentences totaling three years and six months for, inter alia,
drunk driving, petty theft, violations of probation and violations of
the Aeronautics Act.80 Petitioner had argued that misdemeanants are
denied equal protection of law because they are denied the considera-
tions imposed on consecutive sentences for felonies by the Determi-
nate Sentencing Law; under those limitations, the misdemeanant's
maximum sentence would have been two years.8 1
The court explicitly recognized that application of a strict scrutiny
standard was required.8 2 However, the court rejected petitioner's
equal protection argument, because "[a] felon is uniquely burdened
by a diverse collection of statutorily imposed disabilities long after
74. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15 § 1006. Without discussion, the court in In re Valenti
refers to "significant difference in the quality and duration of punishment" resulting
from conviction for a felony as opposed to conviction for a misdemeanor. 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 12. However, the conditions of incarceration in county jail facilities, the sub-
ject of judicial sanctions and much publicity in the past year, suggest that the differ-
ence in the quality of punishment disproportionately affects the misdemeanant, not
the felon. See, e.g., Fischer v. Winter, 564 F. Supp. 281 (N.D. Cal. 1983). See also L.A.
Times, Mar. 29, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 1.
75. 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1985).
76. Id. See supra note 43.
77. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 15, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
78. Id. at 26, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
79. 224 Cal. Rptr. 10 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
80. Id.
81. Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(a),(g) (West Supp. 1986). See supra notes 12-20
and accompanying text.
82. In re Valenti, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 12 n.2.
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his release from prison"8 3 and because "[t]he state has a compelling
interest to protect its law abiding citizens by discouraging the crimi-
nal element from repeatedly violating its laws."84
The court's conclusion that the governmental objectives of the De-
terminate Sentencing Law "are inapplicable in this case"8 5 might be
rationalized in the context of Haendiges and Powell by the relatively
short sentence actually imposed and the relatively small disparity be-
tween the sentence imposed and the sentence that would have been
imposed under the limits of the Determinate Sentencing Law. How-
ever, the crucial questions of legislative intent and the applicability of
the objectives of the Determinate Sentencing Law are unaddressed
by the court's opinion in Valenti. Post-release disabilities unique to
felons are am encroachment on personal freedom, but they do not
constitute the deprivation of liberty that is recognized as a fundamen-
tal liberty interest common to felons and misdemeanants who are
confined for the same purpose, punishment for crime.8 6 Moreover,
the state's compelling purpose of discouraging repeated violations of
its laws applies to felons as much as to misdemeanants, if not more.
The state itself saw fit to limit that objective with respect to felons
by the Determinate Sentencing Law, declaring that "the purpose of
imprisonment for crime . . . is best served by terms proportionate to
the seriousness of the offense with provisos for uniformity in the
sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar
circumstances."87 Given this clear statement of legislative intent, the
appellate court's apparent rejection of equal protection for all misde-
meanants appears to be contrary to the constitutional and public pol-
icy bases the legislature had invoked. No compelling state interest is
offered for different treatment of felons and misdemeanants; no dis-
tinction in law is necessary to further the state's interest in imposing
punishment on felons and misdemeanants in proportion to their
crimes and offenses.
2. Cruel And Unusual Punishment And Proportionality
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution declares,
83. Id. at 13. See also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
84. In re Valenti, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 13. Cf Haendiges, 142 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 28,
191 Cal. Rptr. at 799 (1983) (Foster, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
infra note 114.
85. In re Valenti, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
86. See su,'ra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1(a) (West Supp. 1986); see supra note 12 and accom-
panying text.
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." 8 "The final clause
prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed.18 9 Article I, section 17 of
the California Constitution provides the same protection, although
the state is permitted to interpret its provision to provide even
greater protection than that provided by the correlative federal
provision.90
Outside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to
the proportionality of particular sentences have been exceedingly
rare.91 The most recent consideration of eighth amendment propor-
tionality review by the United States Supreme Court outside the cap-
ital punishment realm has been in review of state recidivist statutes
which impose life sentences following a certain number of separate
felony convictions.
In Rummel v. Estelle,92 the Court upheld against a cruel and unu-
sual punishment challenge a Texas statute which imposed a life sen-
tence on William James Rummel following his third felony
conviction. Rummel's three offenses were fraudulent use of a credit
card to obtain $80 worth of goods and services, passing a forged check
in the amount of $28.36, and obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses.
The Court noted that "one could argue without fear of contradiction
by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified
and classifiable as felonies .... the length of the sentence actually
imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." 93
Three years after Rummel v. Estelle, the court reviewed a life sen-
tence imposed pursuant to a state recidivist statute, this time South
Dakota's, in Solem v. Helm.94 Jerry Helm had been convicted of
seven nonviolent felonies: three counts of third-degree burglary; one
count of obtaining money under false pretenses, one count of grand
larceny, one count of third-offense driving while intoxicated; and, fi-
nally, uttering a "no account" check for $100. The last offense was
charged under the recidivist statute, which resulted in a sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. In overturning
Helm's sentence, the Court apparently felt that the unavailability of
parole, which was available to Rummel in as "little" as twelve years,
was the factor which tipped the proportionality scale and violated the
88. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
89. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
90. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112-15, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315, 328-31 (1975).
91. See Weems v. U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
92. 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
93. Id. at 274.
94. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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eighth amendment.95
In light of the extreme sentence that had to be imposed before the
United States Supreme Court would find that the eighth amendment
had been affronted, it is not at all surprising that the Appellate De-
partment of the Los Angeles Superior Court did not find cruel and
unusual punishment in terms of disproportionality in the six and
one-half year misdemeanor sentence in People v. Powell.96 The court
reached that result even though it found that the sentence imposed
exceeded the maximum permissible sentence that could have been
imposed had all the offenses been charged as felonies. It appears that
constitutional provisions against cruel and unusual punishment have
extremely high proportionality tolerances. It therefore seems quite
unlikely that even the most disproportionate misdemeanor sentence,
even if proportionality is measured against felony sentences, will re-
sult in a finding that the constitutional protections against cruel and
unusual punishment have been violated.
B. Definitions
Any solution should proceed from the premise that the worst mis-
demeanant should not be punished as harshly, and certainly not
more harshly, than the least felon. As premises go, that may not be
hard to accept. However, going the next step beyond the premise im-
mediately brings us to the problem of defining "least felon" and
"worst misdemeanant." "Worst misdemeanant" is the easier of the
two to define. We shall define "worst misdemeanant" to be a person
who stands convicted of multiple counts of any misdemeanors carry-
ing maximum sentences of one year in county jail. This choice is
made because such misdemeanors represent the crimes that the legis-
lature has deemed to be the most serious offenses which may be pun-
ished as misdemeanors.97 One year is also the maximum sentence
available for "wobblers" punished as misdemeanors. Not surpris-
ingly, "wobblers" of this sort are also the offenses perceived by the
general public as some of the most serious misdemeanors, and in-
clude such offenses as burglary, grand theft, forgery, receiving stolen
property, battery on a police officer with injury, assault with a deadly
weapon, and vehicular manslaughter; each such misdemeanor may be
95. Id. at 300-301. "Rather than being an ad hoc exercise of clemency, parole is an
established variation on imprisonment of convicted criminals." Id. at 301.
96. 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1985).
97. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
punished by a sentence of up to one year in jail.98
Defining the "least felon" on the other hand presents difficulties.
Failure to pay child support, a "wobbler" which is punishable as a fel-
ony by a state prison sentence of one year and one day, carries the
lowest felony punishment.99 However, because of the singularity of
its punishment and the almost civil nature of the offense, it would
not be a fair and representative example. The next gradation is the
more typical "wobbler" punished as a felony, with a sentencing range
of sixteen months, two years or three years in state prison.1 00 Be-
cause of the option to designate these offenses as misdemeanors, they
are the class of offenses best representing the "least felonies."
However, because of the three sentencing choices set forth for felo-
nies and the fact that the choice of sentence is a direct consequence
of the seriousness of the circumstances of the particular offense, the
designation of "least felony" remains difficult. While it is tempting
to designate as the "least felon" the one who receives the lowest au-
thorized sentence, sixteen months, that temptation must be resisted
for several reasons. First, case law which has recognized the appar-
ent anomaly in misdemeanor sentencing when compared with felony
sentencing has focused on the maximum authorized sentence for
multiple felony "wobblers."101 Second, since it is not the sentence on
an individual count that is under consideration, but rather multiple
consecutive sentences, using the low term seems unrealistic. It is
fairly rare for consecutive sentences to be imposed in conjunction
with the lower base term sentence. Consecutive sentences are much
more likely and justifiable when the base term is the middle or upper
term. The use of middle base term cases, which have a maximum ag-
gregate term of four years when consecutive sentences are imposed
due to the double-the-base-term rule, is reasonable and probably
most representative of the "least felon" who is also likely to get con-
secutive sentences. However, in the interest of consistency with the
case law and out of a conservative approach to what will not seem to
some like a conservative solution, we will avoid making a definitive
designation, in favor of using both middle and upper base term cases
as examples. As prevously noted, consecutive sentences for felony
"wobblers" with a two year base term result in a maximum four-year
aggregate term; if the base term is three years the maximum is six
years.102
98. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
99. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1986); see supra note 41.
100. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
101. People v. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1985); People v.
Haendiges, 142 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 9, 191 Cal. Rptr. 785 (1983).
102. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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C. The Scope of the Problem
With definitions in hand, examples of absurdly disparate sentenc-
ing based on whether the offenses are felonies or misdemeanors are
easy to provide. Take, for example, a defendant convicted of ten
counts. If the convictions are all "wobblers" charged as felonies, the
maximum sentence that may be imposed is six years in state prison.
If, however, those same crimes are all charged as misdemeanors with
a maximum sentence of one year for each, the defendant may be sen-
tenced to a total of ten years in county jail. Although no case has
dealt with this extreme situation where the misdemeanors had no al-
ternative felony counterpart for sentencing, the cases suggest that
any aggregate misdemeanor sentence in excess of six years would
still be found to violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
The Appellate Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court
dealt with the situation of a defendant who was sentenced on "wob-
blers" charged as misdemeanors to an aggregate term of six and one-
half years, six months more than would have been the case had the
very same offenses been charged as felonies and a maximum prison
term been imposed.103 In holding that the sentence violated equal
protection principles, the court suggested that the same cap would
apply had the offenses been straight misdemeanors instead of "wob-
blers."104 That is the same solution reached by the California Attor-
ney General in an opinion as to the maximum term of commitment
for mentally disordered sex offenders convicted of only
misdemeanors.O5
103. People v. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1985).
104. Id. at 26, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 464. In re Valenti, 224 Cal. Rptr. 10 (2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1986), holding to the contrary, is not persuasive, even if it is distinguished only on
the length of the sentence involved, three years and six months. See supra notes 79-87
and accompanying text.
105. 63 Op. Cal. Att'y. Gen. 199 (1980). The opinion rejected a literal interpretation
of the statute for sentencing mentally disordered sex offenders. The initial computa-
tion of the maximum term was made by referring to California Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 6316.1(c) which defined the "maximum term of commitment" as
"[t]he longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed for the offense or
offenses of which the defendant was convicted, including the upper term ... for en-
hancements and consecutive sentences . . . less any applicable credit .... ." CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6316.1(c) (repealed by 1981 Stats. 3485). The Attorney General
held that in the case of a "wobbler" the maximum term may not exceed the maximum
term the mentally disordered sex offender would have received had the crimes of
which he was convicted been determined to be felonies rather than misdemeanors.
With misdemeanors with no alternative felony punishment, the mentally disordered
sex offender's maximum term may not exceed the maximum he would have received
While a six year maximum for consecutive misdemeanor sentences
would impose a limit where now no limit at all exists, it still does not
eliminate the anomaly or address the lack of proportionality
presented by six year misdemeanor sentences. A six year maximum
is posited as merely the most that constitutional limits can tolerate.
A six year imposed sentence is the gross sentence; the net sentence,
or the amount of time the defendant actually spends in custody, is
calculated by reducing the gross sentence by the application of work
credits and good conduct credits. A misdemeanant may earn up to
one-third off of his gross sentence; a felon in state prison may earn
up to one-half off of his gross sentence. 106 On a six year sentence,
therefore, the misdemeanant may actually serve a full year more in
custody than the felon.
The differences in available credits for felons and misdemeanants
have withstood a constitutionally-based equal protection challenge.107
However, that single appellate court's answer to the constitutional
challenge to credits available against time served begs the question of
proportionality and fundamental fairness. The misdemeanant who
serves four years of a six year sentence is probably not comforted by
the knowledge that, even though he would serve only three years
had he had the foresight to commit felonies, his constitutional rights
are still intact. Although the legislature's declaration of intent con-
tained in the Determinate Sentencing Law is limited to felonies,
there is no reason to believe that the legislature did not also intend
that misdemeanor sentences be proportionate to the seriousness of
the offense and free from disparity.10s When individual offenses are
had the misdemeanors been punishable under California Penal Code section 18, a de-
terminate sentence of sixteen months, two years, or three years. 63 Op. Cal. Att'y
Gen. at 207. The Attorney General's opinion also applies to the sentencing of persons
found not guilty by reason of insanity.
In the juvenile setting, the California Supreme Court held that section 1170.1 of the
Penal Code would be applicable to both misdemeanors and felonies in In re Eric J., 25
Cal. 3d 522, 536-37, 601 P.2d 549, 556-57, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317, 324-25 (1979). The court
based this language on the specific mandate of section 726(c) of the Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code, which provides: "If the court elects to aggregate the period of physical
confinement on multiple counts, or multiple petitions . . . the maximum term of im-
prisonment shall be specified in accordance with subdivision (a) of § 1170.1 of the Pe-
nal Code." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 726(c) (West 1984). The court erred, however,
in commenting that the legislature's omission of misdemeanors in section 1170.1 was a
clear statement of its intent not to put a cap on consecutive misdemeanor sentencing.
Section 1170.1 was part of the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976 which was
enacted by the legislature as a total reform of felony sentencing laws. See supra notes
11-12 and accompanying text. Misdemeanor sentencing was not even considered in the
preparation and passage of this act; accidental exclusion by omission should not be con-
strued as an affirmative showing of legislative intent.
106. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
107. People v. Sage, 26 Cal. 3d 498, 611 P.2d 874, 165 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1980).
108. See also People v. Powell, 166 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 12, 212 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1985).
Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1986).
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compared, there is nearly perfect proportionality in sentences. How-
ever, when multiple consecutive misdemeanor sentences are imposed,
that proportionality is nowhere to be found and potentially absurd
disparate sentencing becomes the rule, despite the example of the
Determinate Sentencing Law and the absence of any support to be
found anywhere in legislative intent.
V. A SOLUTION TO THE INEQUITY
The drafters of the Model Penal Code, whose felony sentencing
scheme is strikingly similar to the Determinate Sentencing Law, rec-
ognized the potential problem with consecutive misdemeanor
sentences and therefore proposed that a limit be placed on the aggre-
gate length of such sentences. 109 New York takes a novel, but effec-
tive approach. Although there is no limit on the aggregate length of
misdemeanor sentences which may be imposed, the defendant stays
in jail until he has served his entire sentence with reduction for ap-
plicable conduct credits, or until he has served two years, whichever
comes first.110 The explanatory notes to the New York statute de-
clare that this is not a limit on the court's ability to sentence, but
rather is merely direction as to the calculation of the service of the
sentence."1 '
Judge Vernon G. Foster of the Superior Court of the State of Cali-
fornia for the County of Los Angeles offered another point of view in
his concurring and dissenting opinion in People v. Haendiges.112 His
solution to the anomaly of consecutive misdemeanor sentencing is
not to impose restrictions on misdemeanor sentencing, but to remove
109. When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for
more than one crime . . . such multiple sentences shall run concurrently or
consecutively as the Court determines at the time of sentence, except that...
(b) the aggregate of consecutive definite terms shall not exceed one year; and
(c) the aggregate of consecutive multiple terms shall not exceed in minimum
or maximum length the longest extended term authorized for the highest
grade and degree of crime for which any of the sentences was imposed...
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.06(1) (1985).
110. The New York statute provides in pertinent part:
Where a person is under more than one definite sentence, the sentences shall
be calculated as follows . . . (b) if the sentences run consecutively and are to
be served in a single institution, the terms are added to arrive at an aggregate
term and are satisfied by discharge of such aggregate term, or by service of
two years imprisoment plus any term imposed for an offense committed while
the person is under the sentences, whichever is less ....
NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 70.30(2) (McKinney 1975).
111. See id. practice commentaries at 252.
112. 142 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 9, 26, 191 Cal. Rptr. 785, 797 (1983) (Foster, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
the restrictions from felony sentencing. While that solution would
certainly eliminate the obvious anomaly of the statutes, it would re-
quire that the legislature abandon its goals of proportionality and the
elimination of disparity in sentencing. Moreover, expanding the
"Wild West" tenor of misdemeanor sentences to encompass felony
sentencing would immediately result in a confrontation with well-es-
tablished judicial concerns for proportionality and the elimination of
disparity in felony sentencing. A more reasonable and workable so-
lution would be the fixing of a limit on the length of the aggregate
term which may be imposed or served for multiple misdemeanor
convictions.
The New York limit of two full years in actual custody fits propor-
tionally into California's sentencing scheme so exactly that it serves
as a virtually perfect model. Accordingly, we propose a limit of two
years, either imposed or served, for multiple misdemeanor convic-
tions. Under present law, the maximum sentence for any single mis-
demeanor is one year, which is one-third of the maximum for most
"wobblers" charged as felonies. The proposed two year limit on ag-
gregate consecutive sentences is one-third of the maximum aggregate
consecutive term for multiple "wobblers" charged as felonies. This
limit also takes into consideration that county jails are designed for
shorter term housing than are state prisons.113
Still, the internal logic and consistency of such a solution alone
does not address the sentiment expressed by Judge Foster in People
v. Haendiges:
[N]o one as yet has suggested a convincing reason why, if the purpose of sen-
tencing is punishment, one who commits a series of crimes receives a full
measure of punishment for only the first offense, but he is permitted to com-
mit subsequent crimes at bargain rates until he amasses a sufficient number
of them so that all additional crimes are "on the house."1 1 4
While there may be no "convincing" reasons, the simple reason is
that the legislature has deemed such a scheme sufficiently punitive.
Prior offenses may be used to enhance sentences in felonies 115 and in
some misdemeanors.116 A limiting cap on misdemeanor sentencing
may justify sentence enhancement beyond the cap for certain misde-
meanor prior offenses, or justify treating certain misdemeanors as
felonies where prior offenses are present.117
Another disparity in misdemeanor sentencing which deserves cor-
113. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
114. 142 Cal. App. 3d Supp. at 28, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 799 (Foster, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Cf. In re Valenti, 224 Cal. Rptr. 10 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1986); see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
115. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1986). See supra note 4.
116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 666 (West Supp. 1986) (prior conviction of petty theft,
grand theft, burglary or robbery).
117. STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURE Stan-
dard 6.2 commentary at 280 (1968).
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rection is the inability of the sentencing court to reconsider its sen-
tence once service is commenced. "Little would seem to be served by
freezing a decision that later turns out to have been erroneous. Pro-
visions that the sentencing court can undo what hindsight has
demonstrated to have been a mistake seems the least that is due the
victim." 1 8 This is perhaps best demonstrated by noting that during
fiscal year 1983-84 the Board of Prison Terms found disparate felony
sentences in only forty-two cases out of over 16,000 reviewed.119
When it is realized that over forty percent of the state prison
sentences are for twenty-four months or less, 120 it is likely that more
than forty-two disparate misdemeanor sentences could be located in
any one of the dozen most populous counties in the state even if the
misdemeanors were compared for disparity with felonies. Accord-
ingly, we propose that provisions for reconsideration and review of
multiple consecutive misdemeanor sentences, comparable to those
provided for felony sentences, be included in legislation addressing
this problem.
California's felony sentencing scheme well serves the purposes in-
tended by the legislature. The California courts that have considered
the question whether equal protection requires that the "one-third
the middle -term" and "double base term" rules be applied to misde-
meanors as well as felonies have disagreed. Whatever the result with
pending appeals and cases still to come before the courts, the ulti-
mate solution lies with and should come from the legislature. If uni-
formity and proportionality in sentencing and the elimination of
disparity are truly the intent of the legislature, then it is time for our
lawmakers -to turn their attention to the kinds of sentences which
make up the vast majority of those imposed in this state, the
sentences for misdemeanors.
118. Cf CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 666 and 484 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986).
119. REPORT, supra note 27, at 7, 31.
120. Id.

